I. Introduction
In an attempt to understand the connection or lack thereof between the state of nature and political ideology, I will examine the specific relationship between Thomas Hobbes’s state of nature and the ideology of libertarianism. The analyzation of the relationship is due to the high degree of prima facie difference. Hobbes, as elaborated later, advocates for an absolute sovereign to possess authority over the State while the libertarian ideology advances the concept of minimal government. By analyzing the relationship between the two components, I aim to demonstrate a state of nature can produce a fundamentally contrary ideology governing a newly formed State, as the state of nature does not have a significant impact on the newly formed State. This can be achieved provided the swinging pendulum principle is adopted and applied. Ultimately, and more specifically, it is my aim to argue that a libertarian ideology can be the consequence of a Hobbesian state of nature.
II. Hobbes’s State of Nature and Libertarianism
Libertarianism if often held synonymous with the characteristics of John Locke’s state of nature (“Libertarianism” 2018). This parallel is not mainly attributed by way of scholarly work, but by the explicit parallels evident regarding Locke and the libertarian ideology. Furthermore, Locke was the primary political theorist of the classical liberal tradition responsible for advocating man’s natural right to life, liberty, and property (Locke 4). Subsequently, each right was to be adopted later as an unwavering ideal composing the libertarian ideology (“2018 Platform” 2018). Theorists have understood the explicit absence of natural rights in other theories to indicate such is not conducive to the libertarian ideology. One example is that of Thomas Hobbes. Superficial inquiry regarding Hobbes’ conception of state of nature directly refutes the core ideals of the libertarian ideology. However, I will demonstrate that upon further exploration, such is not the case.
Thomas Hobbes is famously quoted as saying “Life in the state of nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (“Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy” 2018). Hobbes conceptualizes a state of nature where all men are equal through the attainment of different highlighted strengths (Lemos 1978, 20). Hobbes then asserts that in the state of nature, no man has any right but to himself (Hobbes 1994, 75). Furthermore, no man has an obligation to any other man but to himself (Hobbes 1994, 75). Hobbes explains, since no man has any natural right or any obligation to his fellow man, there is nothing to stop the constant state of war (Hobbes 1994, 75). Hobbes utilizes the state of war to explain the constant theft, murder, and other acts normally deemed illegal or unjust by a State. This constant state of war is self-perpetuated by competition and diffidence (Hobbes 1994, 75). Another important aspect regarding this school of thought is the rejection of the conception of property.
Hobbes asserts that there can be no conception of property, because such would require men to have natural right and obligation (“Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy” 2018). And since neither qualifier exist, property cannot exist. Because Hobbes argues that obligations do not exist in the state of nature, the corresponding right does not exist. A right can only exist if another will or can acknowledge an obligation. Said acknowledgement of the posited obligation, then in turn provides the respective right. This provides for acknowledgement of property. For there is a difference between possession and property (Lemos 1978, 22). The land one works and the items he claims are possessed by him. The land and items are under his control. however, he does not according to Hobbes own said items, making them property. By classifying one’s items as property, other men in the state of nature must acknowledge the right for one to own the items in his possession and to respect said right of ownership (Lemos 1978, 22). But as discussed prior, said obligations and rights do not exist. Thus, the idea of property is rejected by Hobbes’s with regards to the state of nature.
Having presented Hobbes’s state of nature, I will explore the core ideals of libertarianism. Since the libertarian ideology allows for such a wide array of specific and individual belief, it is important to narrow the ideals. Therefore, I will posit the platform of the libertarian party. The ideals advocated are the right to life, liberty, and property (“2018 Platform”2018). The political party defines the right to life as “…the prohibition of the initiation of force against another” (“2018 Platform” 2018). The right to liberty encompasses the right to free speech and action (“2018 Platform” 2018). Lastly, the right of property is defined as inhibiting the interference of private property and “…support [of] the prohibition of robbery, trespass, fraud, and misrepresentation” (“2018 Platform” 2018). The emphasis the ideology of libertarianism advocates is freedom from government interference (“Libertarian” 2018). Libertarianism does not reject government interference entirely, but rather, asserts that minimum necessary for the functionality of the State.
Next, I will explore the first two laws of nature as advocated by Hobbes. Hobbes’s first law of nature is that man aims at peace. Man’s rational goal is to aim at peace and to act in accordance with it (“Hobbes Moral and Political Philosophy” 2018). His second law of nature is that man should lay down his right to all things insofar as other men do the same (“Hobbes Moral and Political Philosophy” 2018). This is also referred to as the law of contract (Hobbes 1994, 80). Hobbes introduces the second law to prevent some men from being subjected as prey to those who refuse to forfeit their right to nature. As simply stated, man should forfeit his right to nature if and only if his fellow men endeavor likewise. However, what would result if men refused to forfeit their right to nature? As Hobbes notes, men would return to the state of nature and thus return to the state of war (Hobbes 1994, 80). Consequently, the third law of nature Hobbes asserts is that men must adhere to the compacts they make (Lemos 1978, 26). If those who forfeit their right to nature, then subsequently reclaim their right, this would perpetrate an unjust state of nature.
III. Analysis and Application
First it is my aim to explain and justify the swinging pendulum principle, which will serve as the further justification for man’s transition from Hobbes’s state of nature to a libertarian ideology. The principle aims at the explanation of historical events where man transitions from one form of governance or ideology to another. The shift or transition is considered the “swing” from one ideology to another. But said principle need not only apply in situations regarding a complete ideological shift. The swinging pendulum principle can be utilized to explain shifts of a minor nature. But nevertheless, can only explain situations in which the contrary is reached. One such example as demonstrated by history, the American Revolution. The U.S.A. was originally considered to be a colony of the United Kingdom and was governed by a constitutional monarchy. However, dissatisfied with the governance of a constitutional monarchy the American colonies revolted, which resulted in independence (Wallace 2018). Having encountered what, the colonists deemed as injustices, they sought to remedy said injustices in their new form of governance, a republican democracy. An example of an injustice incurred was the relationship between taxation and representation. The American colonies did not receive representation and parliament and therefore did not have any influence with respect to the tax imposed on them (Walczak 2018). Thus, when conceiving a new form of governance, the American colonist made it such that if one is to be taxed, they will have some form of representation in government (Walczak 2018). This specific injustice and other incurred also resulted in the shift from a constitutional monarchy to a republican democracy. The foundation of the swinging pendulum principle is not rooted in the sole case of the American Revolution. It has been demonstrated with regards to the French Revolution, Haitian Revolution, Russian Revolution, and many others.
Since the swinging pendulum principle has been introduced and explained, I will now apply said principle to the conceptions of Hobbes’s state of nature. The first demonstration of the principle is to negate Hobbes’s assertion that man does not have a right to life, insofar as the obligation is absent for men to abide. The aim of the principle is to transition man from possessing solely the right to nature to the right of life, defined as “…prohibition of the initiation of force against others” (“2018 Platform” 2018). Hobbes asserts that man has no right other than that of nature (“Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy” 2018). While such a reasonable right is posited regarding the state of nature, such a right will diminish in value during the transition from the state of nature to Statehood. If Hobbes’s law of contract is applied, then when man enters Statehood, he will not possess the right to nature. But if man were to retain said right, the consequence of the return to the state of nature would follow (Hobbes 1994, 80). However, because as Hobbes argues that man is a rational being, man would not forfeit his right to nature without the implementation of safeguards. To abandon the need for protection completely would be an irrational act. Thus, man will ensure safeguards are implemented when transitioning to Statehood. The safeguards man establishes is a product of the swinging pendulum principle. As the constant state of war experienced in the state of nature did not provide for individual security, such an injustice is to be remedied when the transition into Statehood occurs. Therefore, men have the ability to possess a libertarian right after the transition into Statehood occurs.
However, a counter to the claim I advance, would assert that the right derived from the swinging pendulum principle does not guarantee a libertarian State. Instead, the absolute sovereign Hobbes argues for can mandate the libertarian right and still maintain control and status as an absolute sovereign (Lemos 1974, 34). More generally, the rights produced by the implementation of the principle do not preclude the form of governance assumed in the State. And while I grant the criticism correct, it merely emphasizes an issue with the transition from the state of nature to the State, I continue to aim to demonstrate throughout the paper. The state of nature does not influence the form of governance assumed when man enters Statehood. Rather, its sole purpose is to identify the behavior of man in the absence of a political authority. Thus,Hobbes’s absolute sovereign is not a necessary condition for his political theory because other forms of governance, such libertarianism, can be implemented and his state of nature maintained. The aim of the of the paper is to demonstrate the possibility of a different ideology and form of governance can be conceived provide Hobbes’s state of nature. Not that such is to or ought to occur.
The next right at which the swinging pendulum principle aims is that of liberty. Liberty is understood by the Libertarian party as the right to free speech and action (“2018 Platform” 2018). But it is imperative to note, that Hobbes does not explicitly assert either from occurring in the state of nature. Rather, if understood superficially, the state of nature Hobbes advances could be misunderstood to encourage free speech and action. However, when analyzed further, Hobbes’s state of nature does not provide a right to free speech and action. Instead, the state of nature imposes restraints which result in the absence of a right to free speech and action. The implicit restriction can be understood by examining the relationship between man’s right to nature, the constant state of war, and fear. Man’s right to nature enables and requires him to act to secure and maintain his self-preservation (Lemos 1974, 21). This right is exercised in the constant state of war. Therefore, man’s highest concern is self-preservation. But man’s aim of self-preservation can be compromised if he conducts himself in inappropriate ways, provided the context of the state of war. One such example is berating the daughter of a neighbor. Such an act has the potential to give way to a retributive act conducted by the parents of the girl out of retaliation. This example demonstrates that due to the lack of restriction regarding the conduct in the state of nature, man cannot speech freely or act as such due to the possible repercussions. The constant fear that man faces in the Hobbes’s state of nature, pertaining to his conduct, precludes freedom of speech and action. Therefore, men wanting to rid themselves of the constant fear as relating to their conduct, upon entering the state of nature, will adopt measures to ensure the freedoms of speech and action. For the fear of retaliation does not allow men the expression needed.
One counter argument likely to be asserted is that fear is not an actual restraint that Hobbes intentionally posits in his state of nature. Rather, fear is an unintentional byproduct and such does not preclude man from possessing the ability to freely speak and act. Proponents of free will would utilize the argument that since man had the ability not to speak and act as opposed to speak or act, then he acted freely. And thus, the right to freedom of speech and action is not precluded by Hobbes’s state of nature. This is known as the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) (Widerker 1995, 247) Therefore, as with the right to nature, since it is endowed to all men and all men must respect its corresponding obligation, man does have the right to free speech and action in the state of nature. However, as argued prior, man is not free with regards to speech and action in Hobbes’s state of nature. Because Hobbes asserts that the right to nature is the only right and said right yields the preservation of man, said right is at which all of man’s actions are aimed. Thus, man can only act in accordance with the law of nature as posited by Hobbes. This yields the consequence that if man acts contrary to the law of nature, he forfeits his self-preservation. The fear that man abides by dictates his actions to parallel Hobbes’s right. Thus, without the protection offered in the state of nature, man does not possess a right to freedom of speech and action. And since few rational men forfeit their life for the freedom to speak and act, this fear does act as a constraint.
The last and final application of the swinging pendulum principle to establish the libertarian ideology is the right of private property. As mentioned earlier, Hobbes’s state of nature does not posit a right to private property either implicitly or explicitly. For Hobbes’s political theory to maintain consistency, his conception of the state of nature must not allow either imposed obligations or rights. Understanding such, it would seem contradictory that a libertarian ideology could be derived from Hobbes’s state of nature, as private property is a pillar of the ideology. However, the swinging pendulum principle enables the conception of private property as a derivative. The state of nature Hobbes advances can produce a right that conforms to the libertarian ideology with regards to the protection of private property.
The implementation of a right to private property can be divided into two categories. Private property is either centered on a positivist legal right or a natural right. Since there is an absence of governance regarding the state of nature, the positivist right cannot be asserted. This is because there is no government to legislate the right. Furthermore, Hobbes asserts that man do not have natural rights (Lemos 1974, 22). Therefore, it is not a natural right in the state of nature for men to possess private property. Thus, the establishment of private property as a right will result only by means of positing a positive right when the transition from the state of nature to Statehood occurs. When said transition does occur, men by way of the swinging pendulum principle, remedy the disadvantages of not possessing private property in the state of nature. Since men could not by right, own property, the principle will result in the contrary yielding the consequent of private property.
When applied in conjunction with the transition into Statehood, the swinging pendulum principle achieves the positivist legal right. After the transition into Statehood occurs, there is a government able to enact legislation to create and enforce the right of private property. The principle acts as to ensure during the formation of the State that the now citizenry seeks said right. As mentioned, man has the right to nature, also known as self-preservation (Lemos 1974, 22). In the state of nature such could be demonstrated in the cultivation of land by means of growing food and building shelter. But because no right exists to claim the food cultivated or the shelter built on the land, man must defend the fruits of their labor. This constant state of war in defense of one’s products leads to inevitable resentment and the perpetuation of war. The feelings experienced would then lead to the desire to assert a right over one’s possessions. Thus, the reasoning behind the swinging pendulum principle as related to private property is identified. This would yield the consequence that once man transitions into Statehood, having experienced the injustice for fighting for their goods, would prohibit such from occurring. And since there would be a State to legislation and enforce said rights, the libertarian right of private property will be enacted.
Having examined effects, the swinging pendulum principle has on the rights or lack thereof on Hobbes’s state of nature, I will now analyze the remedy sought by Hobbes. Because men in the state of nature were in a constant state of war and which cannot be reconciled with the ultimate aim, peace, men enter Statehood (Hobbes 1994, 81). However, the governance man adopts, according to Hobbes, is that of an absolute sovereign (Lemos 1974, 32). This is compelled by terror and fear (Lemos 1974, 32). However, as demonstrated above, there is no direct cause for man to transition to Statehood and adopt an absolute sovereign. The chaos of the state of war and the brutish nature does not have a causal relationship to an absolute sovereign. Rather, as it was my aim to argue, the state of nature does not have an impact on the ideology or governance the State adopts after the transformation. Hobbes’s political theory regarding the necessity of an absolute sovereign to control the conduct of man once in a State is misplaced. The placement of a monarchy or democracy or any ideology could have been justified. As specifically demonstrated throughout the application section, the ideology of libertarianism could be a consequence of the transition as a result of the swinging pendulum principle.
IV. Conclusion
Throughout the paper, it has been my aim to argue that the transition into Statehood is not significantly impacted by the State of nature. And by doing so, the form of governance and the ideology particular to a State are not consequences of the State of nature. Rather, both are posited by political theorist as what they deem the ideal State ought to entail. I accomplished this goal by specifically arguing that the ideology of libertarianism can arise as a consequent of Hobbes’sstate of nature. As mentioned before, this is due to the examined and accepted differences between the two entities. But by incorporating and applying the self-proclaimed swinging pendulum principle I was able to demonstrate the two entities could be reconciled. Furthermore, the reconciliation between Hobbes’s state of nature and the libertarian ideology demonstrated that Locke’s state of nature does not need to be presupposed with regards to the libertarian ideology. Thus, the state of nature provides little benefit beyond a thought experiment.
References
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Ivory Tower 